Seeable Relationship. Sayable connection. #03

This post is not organised writing or essay, but the fragmented thought.

Previous

Were we to attempt to see the intervals between things as themselves things, the appearance of the world would be just as noticeably changed

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, and Donald A. Landes, Phenomenology of Perception (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 16

If we hold ourselves to phenomena, then the unity of the thing in perception is not constructed through association, but rather, being the condition of association, this unity precedes the cross-checkings that verify and determine it, this unity precedes itself. If I am walking on a beach toward a boat that has run aground, and if the funnel or the mast merges with the forest that borders the dune, then there will be a moment in which these details suddenly reunite with the boat and become welded to it. As I approached, I did not perceive the resemblances or the proximities that were, in the end, about to reunite with the superstructure of the ship in an unbroken picture. I merely felt that the appearance of the object was about to change, that something was imminent in this tension, as the storm is imminent in the clouds.The spectacle was suddenly reorganised, satisfying my vague expectation. Afterward I recognised, as justifications for the change, the resemblance and the contiguity of what I call “stimuli,” that is, the most determinate phenomena obtained from up close and with which I compose the “true” world.

Ibid, pp. 17-18

The unity of the object is established upon the presentiment of an imminent order that will, suddenly, respond to questions that are merely latent in the landscape. It will resolve a problem only posed in the form of a vague uneasiness;

Ibid, p. 18

Is the moment changing? The duration of changing? There is an interesting example by Merleau-Ponty, which is used as the rabbit and the hunter image in English and french version, but different example in Korean translation. When one woman saw her hotel uniform lover, he is a handsome and beautiful lover. But when she saw him by accident around the hotel, he is just a uniformed hotel carrier. (Each book in French and English pages are below.) I am assuming this example differences because the translator used another source such as the Japanese or German version. However, it is fascinating differences how two examples can explain same thing in different way about the shifting of the unity from one to another without interrupting two unity world. Further, for me, it should be approached differently as a lover and as an image. Well, let’s find out how I can use this example

Merleau-Ponty claims that unity of the thing in perception is not constructed through association, but rather, being the condition of association, which can deliver the immediate answer.

Phenomenology of Perception

The unity of the object is established upon the presentiment of an imminent order that will, suddenly, respond to questions that are merely latent in the landscape. It will resolve a problem only posed in the form of a vague uneasiness; it organises elements that until then did not belong to the same universe and which, for that reason, as Kant said insightfully, could not have been associated.

대상의 통일성은 예의 그 광경에 잠재되어 있을 뿐인 문제에 대하여 단숨에 답을 제공하려는 임박한 질서의 예감에 기초해 있고, 모호한 궁금증의 형태로만 제기 되었을 뿐인 문제를 해결해주며, 그 통일에 도달할 때까지 동일한 세계에 속하지 않았던, 그 때문에 칸트가 심원하게 말한 바대로 연합될 수 없었다던 요소들을 조직한다.

Ibid, p. 18

What answer? Answer from the vagueness? Is that means unity is immanent in the quality of the duration even before the unity? Or is it within the duration of the changing? Or shifting. Once this unity constructed until it is changed into a different world, it habitually maintains its world. Him as a unity of the constructed world. This changing should be a painful and aggressive one. Until then, he would be, or I would see him as a different from the others and not as my unity.

The condition of the seeable, which is stimulated by space or the knowledge, doesn’t satisfy my question of the seeable him (Well, obviously, I just started phenomenology of perception, so I guess there is a long way to go). But I remember Susan Sontag is questioning in her book about the pain from the war pictures. Are we used to its pain because photo exposed too often? Or are we getting a different way of affection?


  • Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phénoménologie De La Perception, Tel, 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), p. 23; Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, and Donald A. Landes, Phenomenology of Perception (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 16
  • Sontag, Susan, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York, N.Y: Picador, 2003)

Extra ➡︎ Action and Speech

Reference: Emmelhainz, Irmgard, ‘Can We Share a World Beyond Representation?’, 106, 2020, pp, 1-10

In The Human Condition Arendt stresses repeatedly that action is primarily symbolic in character and that the web of human relationships is sustained by communicative interaction (HC, 178–9, 184–6, 199–200). We may formulate it as follows. Action entails speech: by means of language we are able to articulate the meaning of our actions and to coordinate the actions of a plurality of agents. Conversely, speech entails action, not only in the sense that speech itself is a form of action, or that most acts are performed in the manner of speech, but in the sense that action is often the means whereby we check the sincerity of the speaker.

01

  • Lebenswelt: the world of common human experience and interpretation.
  • According to Arendt, modernity, propelled by the destruction of all tradition, is characterised by the irretrievable loss of the experience of shared meaning, which was previously created by talking to and making sense with one another. This loss is accompanied by the disappearance of a space for arguing, resining, argumentation: the space of politics, comprised of speech and action. ::Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Penguin Classics (New York: Penguin Books, 2006)::
  • As Gilles Deleuze put it, the link between man and the world has been broken. Modernity also means the replacement of “society” and “community” by “mass society.”
  • For Arendt, mass society is characterised by isolation and a lack of normal social relationships; as a result, consciousness of a common interest is absent.

04

  • For Hannah Arendt, the expansion of authoritarianism in Europes in the twentieth century stemmed from the alienation and loneliness brought about by the degradation of the world in common. ➡︎ 문화적 요소가 결핍됬다기 보다 커지면서 퍼진거겠지
  • Representation — the dispositif that, via speech and action, enables appearance in the world in common, and also the human capacity for the creation and dissemination of shared meaning and traditions — has been hijacked by capitalism, authoritarianism, democracy, the internet, and spectacle. ➡︎ 여기서 디스포지티프 의미는 스트럭쳐, 전통과 의미를 구성하는 디스포지티프 ➡︎ 푸코의 글을 다시 읽어보자.
  • Speech and action ➡︎ 한나 아렌트의 스피치와 액션의 의미는 뭐지?
    • 고전적 구분을 따른 아렌트
    • 폴리스(polis) = 공공적 영역 -> 활동 ➡︎ speech
    • 사회적 영역 ➡︎ 경제 활동 및 결사 혹은 집단 ➡︎ 생의 욕구를 해소 하는 장소
    • 오이코스(oikos) = 사적 영역
  • ::각각의 영역에는 각각의 dispositif가 존재하는 걸까?::
  • 여기서 아마도 푸코와의 차이점은 (혹은 같은 점은) Political I’magination (19세기) reproducers a representative form of social cohesion. They did this by constructing and disseminating a world of shared meaning that expressed the alleged “essence” of an imagined community: shared cultural history, iconography, language, food, and dress. ➡︎ ::Anderson, Benedict R. O’G, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed (London ; New York: Verso, 2006)::
  • 1960년대경에선 아트계에서 abandoned representation and dismissed representativity as totalitarian structures, as vehicles for a bland, sexist, and racist humanism and a trite universalism. ➡︎ 청소년기에 있는 것 처럼 스트럭처를 거부했고 (만들어진 스트럭처) 그러면서 각자가 결국 자신의 젠더, ethnic origin, political struggle, or sexual orientation을 대표하며 입장을 발표했다.
  • Minorities
  • 1980s ‘90s 경에선 representativity 가 다시 되돌아왔고 with a vengeance through identity politics and consciousness-raising activism
  • A new, invisible social contract was drawn up in which individuals would now only speak on behalf of themselves as representatives of their own persona experiences of ethnic, political, or gendered specificities, with the mandate to address “everyone” and to secure recognition of “my” ordeal ➡︎ ::결국 self 는 representation으로 밖에 존재할 수 없게 된 것 아닐까? 나는 나를 represents 한다. Self-representation. 하지만 만약에 이게 계속 된다면, 결국 남는 건 텅 비어버린 representation.::
  • 20세기 후반에 globalisation dismantling of the referential economy of political and aesthetic modernity ➡︎ assigned artists universal representativity. Under globalisation, art is disseminated to a globalised mass society through and internationalised culture industry. ➡︎ ::아트 란 그룹 자체로 representation ➡︎ 이건 사실 아트가 아트만을 얘기하게 된 계기가 될 수도 있겠다.::

07

  • The main problem with artworks that speak on behalf of the struggle of others, or that seek recognition for “my private ordeal.” is that they inhibit a moralising realm of non-shared meaning ➡︎ ::의미 없는 외침:: ➡︎ ::이건 다시 같은 질문으로 되돌아온다, 혼자서만 하는 소리를 작업할 의미가 있는가?:: ➡︎ ::아트 학교에서의 문제점 중에 하나는, 개개인의 목소리에 귀를 기울이기에 점점 더 개인적이 되어가는 질문이 된다는 것에 있을지도 몰라.::
  • When despotic forms of empathy prevail, action and speech are reduced to sheer appearance. Speech without action — such as speech that merely demands recognition — fils to disclose the position that the speaking human occupies in relation to others and the world, beyond simple identitarian or subjective categories. In the opposite case — when we have gestures without speech — these gestures take the form of brute physical action without verbal accompaniment and are thus meaningless (like terrorist attacks or massacres in schools and public spaces.) ➡︎ ::이거야 말로 내가 커뮤니케이션의 중요성을 말했던 부분중에 하나다::
  • For Arendt, actions are only made relevant by the spoken word, which identifies the speaker as the actor announcing what she’s is doing, thereby giving meaning to her actions, but only in relation to others. In other words, no other human behaviour is in greater need of speech than action

09

  • Through speech and action, we not only learn to understand each other as individual persons, but also to see the same world from on another’s (sometimes opposing) standpoints. In this context, universality means that while everyone sees and hears from a different position, some people have the capacity to multiply their own point of view. ➡︎ ::Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Penguin Classics (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 219.::

Seeable Relationship. Sayable connection. #02

This post is not organised writing or essay, but the fragmented thought.

From the last posting, I think it is worth to continue the topic. Although, I am interested in the topic of the moment of becoming ‘seeble’ or the after moment of the affection (I guess I should read Massumi again), it is still related what is ‘seeing,’ in Foucault’s term

First of all, what intrigues me is when Rajchman describe that Foucault’s seeing is not only visionary but is part of doing. There are two ‘doing’ in self-evidence prison, a participation or acceptance we can refuse. In Foucault’s idiom, évidence is related to the acceptability of a practice. “It is to try to see how we might act on what cannot yet be seen in what we do. It is, in short, a “critical” art, and it is in exercising it that Foucault would be, in Deleuze’s term, a seer or voyant (p. 94).” Then, what is the seer? Deleuze explained Foucault’s seer as a someone who seeing unseen évidneces that makes things we do acceptable or tolerable to us (Deleuze, 1986). In other word, Foucault opens up the conversation that unseen self-evidence, which is not hidden but unseeable. Rather deliver decisive answer but, a seer that make unseeable to seeable êvidnece. If I can connect with this relationship, I may say relationship itself, or the moment itself can be an act of seer with out subject.

Foucault found the similarity of the historians eye to the fiction’s making visible the unseen space of seeing; making visible unseen manifest.

not to show (faire voir) the invisible, but to show the extent to which the invisibility of the visible is invisible. Hence [fiction] bears a profound kinship with space. . . .

Foucault/Blanchot, New York, Zone Books, 1987, p. 24.

Similar aim which showing how things might be otherwise, beyond our self-evidences, other possibilities into the life (I would like connect this in next post about the ‘clicking moment of the realisation’; what is realisation? is it from the invisibility? or unseen? and second question would be the relationship with the space, or the power of the space). Furthermore, Foucault continue to the ‘spatialisation’ of the knowledge. Rather than perceptual evidence through a logic of inference, inductive or deductive, as modern western scholars obsession of the observation, the knowledge in fact, constructed as fiction writers.

Here, I should make clear about my understanding, that it is not about the validation of the philosophy or the science, but the social construction of the knowledge and the space, until the eye no longer deciphers the “prose of the world,” and where, therefore, “the eye was … destined to see and only see, and the ear to hear and only hear (Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 43.). There are many way of the “modes of spatialisation,” such as Natural science’s “technology of the visual”: observatories, microscopes, cyclotrons. And experimentation is central to them. This is not only the history of the philosophy or science, but in the fine art, where validation of the eye had been playing main role. While machinery vision replaced human vision, human eyes had located in new way of spatialisation(let’s keep talking about this later.) Of course, both related representation of the language in theFrench idea which voir with évidence(isn’t it same for Deleuze? Folding the idea from the french), and the knowledge as a spatialised contents in the brain. Is it lost space? displace? Here, again question is what is Foucault’s ‘spatialisation?‘ what does it means when he said space makes knowledge seeable? what’s Foucault’s apparatus?

One of the essential conditions for the epistemological “thaw” of medicine at the end of the 18th century was the organization of the hospital as an “examining apparatus.”

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 185.


Seeable Relationship. Sayable connection. #01

When I first saw him.

The seeing is not about the biological vision, but a moment of recognition about a person, as in front of you or in the same space. It can be anywhere–a first meeting, or a date, or in a party. This visibility can be triggered by anything, from the voice or his perfume or small gesture. Actually, it doesn’t matter what makes him seeable because there is no decisive factor for each case. That moment comes without reason or definite time but suddenly make him seeable. Only that time, he arrives in your life, changes my seeing into a different angle. It is not like the romantic movie that illustrates this moment with bright sunshine or the sound of the bell. It is plain moment, something made you notice him. From that moment, the memories with him pile up and becoming accumulation in the part of life.

I have small doubt about what Foucault said “form of visibility.” As Deleuze pointed out, he is an “audiovisual” thinker. His idea about the relationship between space, knowledge, and power are related to visibility. Human’s physical interaction with spatiality creates seeable knowledge, which has been generated in different disciplines and knowledge. Yet, this visibility cannot explain the visibility of the moment of recognition in the individual relationship. My experiment started a long time ago by taking off my glasses. I cannot see clearly, his face nor his features. This restriction of the one sense, however, cannot prevent seeing him once I recognised him. Once he became seeable, vision restriction is not a huge problem to make him feelable. I can see him in the crowd, I can feel him without seeing him. Maybe, this is what Foucault wanted to assert in his book; the power of the moment of becoming seeable. The moment of the awareness.

It generated a few questions; when I could “see” him? Why I can still “see” him? When he becomes a personal relationship? About the personal relationship, when it becomes stronger than the moment of the seeable, personally, it is the moment when he got the name. Not a name of his own, but a name from me. As name becoming more personal, his feature becoming stronger inside of me. One Korean poem I love, Kim Chun Soo’s ‘Flower‘ goes

Before speaking her name
she had been nothing but a gesture.

When I spoke her name,
she came to me and became a flower.

Now who will speak my name,
one fitting this colour and fragrance of mine,
as I had spoken hers
So that I may go to her and become her flower.

We all yearn to become something.
I yearn to become an unforgettable meaning to you
And you to me

Seeable, is more to see the gesture of the form. It has no particular subjectivity until it gets its name. However, I am still questioning, how I noticed him, his form of gesture, feelable gesture, the moment of the seeable to feelable. When he was “nothing but a gesture.” It is difficult question, and I have, yet, no answer about this questions. I only can say, it is beautiful changing, beautiful my own changing, and beautiful forgetting. But I cannot figure out what happened in that moment. This visibility is strong enough to make me forget about before the seeable moment.

What happened exactly?
Why I can see you?
Why I am looking for you?
Why your gesture makes me feel?

I shout a cry

I’m listening to music. What else I can do? In this time, in this mood. I cannot read anymore, I cannot watch anything. I won’t call it depression or sorrow, whatever makes me sound like weak or stupid. I know I am already self-indulgent, but if you want to call me a drama queen, then, so be it. I won’t deny or stop it. If that’s what would see me. How can I do? I can’t change you, as I won’t change myself.

I have anger inside. A devil inside of me. Well, I actually do not know what is inside me. Sometimes, it appears as anger, and sometimes, it explodes as sorrow. I have tried so long time to explain what this monster or real me inside looks like. It is eagerly trying to devour all of you until nothing left on you. It needs to have your everything, and it must know abyss underneath your heart where even you don’t know it exists. But it says I can’t show my desire to you, because it is ugliest and unlovable impairment. Instead, I need to suffer every moment that I can’t have you. So, I leave, before I can’t handle my desire, I fly away even before anything started. All the time. Like poltroon. Before my biggest fear actualised, before I damage someone I love with this horror, as it has damaged me so long time.

Ask, the explanation of everything that I did. Torture, everything that I didn’t do. Criticise, what I wanted to try to do. Tell, I am not deserve anything.

I just wanted a hug. And tell me everything is fine.
I just wanted a hold my hand. And tell me you like naive me.
I just wanted a silly smile. And tell me, I have you.

Instead,
I shout a cry.

Pneumatic disappearance

Why do I like moving image? Is it because it makes me less lonely? or it makes me hard to think anything else than images? When looking back at my work at BA and MA, most of them were cute drawings or pseudo infographics (well, if I can go back to that time, I would erase all of them.) When did I change to video practice? I actually very clearly remember when it was because it was my foremost intense experience I ever have done. I did like liveness of the performance with my video and audiences. Shockingly made me alive. I felt I can disappear and just let my work alone. There was an image that moving seems like it took over my life into themselves and create a new conversation with the people.

Photography or still images doesn’t make me that life. Even if that is performative practice, it doesn’t talk back to the other people, instead, it creates a monologue itself. It feels like it is just a diary or doodles, a trace that I made a trace for someone, it is still part of me. However, the moving image takes my life from me. Soon after I present it, it starts performs itself within a certain time and space, where it doesn’t need me anymore. In that space, I am peeping around that part of me talking to the other, which will reflect me but I would never control with. It is certain death. Not a permanent death but partial death that will be replaced by new life from the presented work.

I want to make my statue that can replace me. Pour my sorrows into that statue so I can keep mine instead.

Desired Desires

I just suddenly started writing and didn’t notice this long… just wrote anything without conclusion…—Sometimes I feel that the connotation of ‘desire’ is, even in Art institutions, inevitably connected with negativity. In many time, desire to live, to be loved, to be happy, and beauty–either sexually or sacred, is conceived as a manifestation of the chaotic and naive expression.


“Pure” babies are monstrously demonstrating those desires. For instance, the desire to devour all the knowledge from the world is associated with the desire to survive. However, as an icon of the “pureness,” those emotions have conceived something that should be protected until it is somehow stained with ‘black desires.’ Surely, it shouldn’t be compared to a ‘pure baby,’ who has no freedom or ability to think about the freedom, with a grown human’s desires in ‘beautifully constructed society,’ which must be protected for the consensual civilisation.

All the anger, recently has shown in many countries, are delivered by the lack of satisfaction of the desires. Which is, I believe, should be the most basic fulfilment; ‘Desire to Live as a Human being.” In my opinion, the negativity of desire is not coming from ‘pure desire,’ but from the laking in desire. Backfire of this poverty of desire causes anger, fury, and finally abandonment. Which we can observe from young people in East Asia(I’m talking here mostly, South Korea and Japan, where young people’s desire are rejected and denied.) This is my most concern recently. More and more desires become and camouflaged into pure anger, as it is the answer of all. However, show your desire, is not means that break down everything with anger, but building the foundation to achieve those desire, which I believe the most potent stimulus for life. Babies are not crying to angry, they cry to fulfil their basic desire.

There should be a reason why these disguises happening. But it is impossible to grasp the one reason for the current social problem, and of course because I’m not a expert for social or economic, so it isn’t make sense that I conclude the reason here. But I’m studying communication, especially for visual and social. Therefore, I believe is it worth to tackle this problem from the ‘desire’ point of view. I believe the power of desires, but before we really understand what is desired and what we want, it cannot show its potentiality and possibility.

201904211525 Peter Wollen’s relationship between photography and time


Photography is like a point,
Film like a line.
— Peter Wollen

Photography near-zero duration and located in an ever-receding ‘then’. At the same time, the spectator’s ‘now’, the moment of looking at the image, has no fixed duration.

Roland Barthes Barthes’ antipathy towards the cinema, which is because his aesthetic is governed by prejudice against linear time and especially against the narrative.

Time

  1. Bernard Comrie’s aspect rather than tense
  • Types of situation, in relation to change (or potential for change) and perspective as well as duration. It is the interlocking of these underlying semantic categories which determines the various aspectual forms taken by verbs in different languages (grosso modo).
    • States
      • Processes
      • Events
        • durative events
        • punctual events. Alongside these categories aspect also involves
    • The concepts of the iterative,
    • The habitual
    • The characteristic.

Photograph’s Captions

사진의 경우 움직이지 않는다, duration도 없다— 비주얼적으로—하지만 그렇다고 해서 그것들이 시간적 속성이 아에 없다는 것은 아니다. 그 예시로 사진이

  • 뉴스 사진 Photography’s captions에서 주로 보이는 non-progressive present (in this case, a narrative present, since the reference is to past time) — events
    ‘What was it like just before and what’s the result going to be?’
  • 사진 아트의 캡션에서는 noun-phrases, lacking verb-forms의 특징을 주로 보인다. — states
    ‘How did it come to be like this or has it always been the same?’
  • 다큐멘터리 사진에서는 progressive present을 종종 찾아볼수 있다. — 대부분 states, 종종 processes
    ‘Is anything going to happen to end or to interrupt this?’
  • 특히나 Muybridge’s 의 사진의 캡션에서는 imperfective가 지속적으로 사용된다. — processes

Lumiere’s L’Arrosseur arrose

  • a man is watering the garden (process)
  • a child comes and stamps on the hose (event)
  • the man is soaked and the garden empty (state)

영화는 Movement 보다는 Squencing으로 이러한 사진적 duration의 흔적을 찾아볼 수 있다.

Barthes의 Camera Lucida 에서 사진은 포즈를 취한 것과 취하지 않은 사진으로 나뉜다. 포즈를 취하지 않은 사진에서는, 그것이 죽어있는 사진이라 할지라도, 그는 죽음을 보지 않는다. 사진에서 사람의 죽음은 state가 아닌 event이다.

Capa photograph of the Spanish Civil War soldier. Spain, 1936.

Comment:


Reference:

201904192103 Wheeling motion and Memory

Theories

13세기 부터 유행한 기억술은 기본적으로 수집(collection)과 재수집(recollection 회상)을 통해 공간을 맵핑하는 것과 연결 된다.

Marcus Tullius Cicero’s version의 경우가 가장 유명한데, Quintilian가 Cicero의 기억의 건축적 이해를 이론을 공식화한 이론은 문화적 랜드마크가 되었다. Cicero와 Quintilian에게 기억이란 inner writing으로 Places are the site of a mnemonic palimpsest.

Some place is chosen of the largest possible extent and characterised by the utmost variety, such as a spacious house divided into a number of rooms. Everything of note therein is carefully imprinted on the mind … The first thought is placed, as it were, in the forecourt; the second, let us say, in the living-room; the remainder are placed in due order all round the impluvium, and entrusted not merely to bedrooms and parlours, but even to the care of statues and the like. This done, when the memory of the facts requires to be revived, all these places are visited in turn … What I have spoken of as being done in a house can equally well be done in connection with public buildings, a long journey, or going through a city or even with pictures. Or we may even imagine such places to ourselves. We require therefore places, real or imaginary, and images or simulacra which we must, of course, invent for ourselves … As Cicero says, ‘we use places as wax .

13세기 기억술 – Ramon Lull

Reeling motion ➡ 기억술

Ramon Lull introduced movement into memory by experimenting with circular motion and creating an art of memory based on setting figures on revolving wheels. Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), especially chapter eight.

Giulio Camillo (1480-1544)

Camillo의 경우는 “기억 극장”을 하나의 콜렉션으로 개발했는데, inner image가 묵상에 모아지면 그것들은 육체적 사인으로 표현되고 그러므로 구체화 되고 극장에서 보여지게 된다고 생각했다.

Giordano Bruno (1548-1600)

18th century — Picturesque space ➡︎ Garden

Auguste Choisy ➡︎ Le Corbusier ➡︎ Eisenstein

18세기에 들어와서 movement와 연계된 연구가 시작됨.

Auguste Choisy’s picturesque view ⬅︎ 아이젠슈테인이 사용함

This philosophy of space embodied a form of fluid, emotive geography.

Le Corbusier

그가 처음 while on the move, site-seeing, streetwalking의 개념으로 건축적 무빙이미지를 적립했음. ➡︎ 이는 현재의 갤러리, 뮤지엄에서 보여주는 무빙 이미지의 전시와 연결되며 With architectural sites that are scenically assembled and imaginatively mobilized, an inner site-seeing is atmospherically produced.

그 외에 가든과 메모리의 대한 글들

  • See also Barbara Maria Stafford, Voyage into Substance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), p. 4.
  • Hohn Dixon Hunt, Gardens and the Picturesque (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).
  • The legacy of the picturesque, in particular, was ‘to enable the imagination to form the habit of feeling through the eye.’ // Christopher Hussey, The Picturesque: Studies in a Point of View (London and New York, 1927), p. 4.

프로이드 — Mystic Writing Pad

Sigmund Freud, ‘A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad,’ in Complete Psychological Works, vol. 9 (London: Standard Edition, 1956).

Mary Carruthers — Memory Theatre

Carruthers의 경우 기억술에 대해 ‘a memory-image’의 효율서을 말하며 “회상”이라는 것은 re-enactment of experience, which involves…imagination and emotion. pp. 59-60.


Art Examples

Douglas Gordon

Psycho, 1993 — Video installation

고든의 작업은 콜렉티브 메모리로서의 필름을 묘사한다.

In fact, Gordon’s work shows that film is our collective memory, not simply because of its subject matter but because of the form that represents it: a technique that goes far back in time and has its roots in the ars memoriae.

Shirin Neshat

Turbulent (1998), Rapture (1999), and Fervor (2000)

On filmic site-seeing, see Giuliana Bruno, ‘Site-Seeing: Architecture and the Moving Image,’ Wide Angle, IXX, no. 4 (October 1997), pp. 8-24.


Comment:


Reference:

Main ➡ Allen, R. & Turvey, M., 2003. Camera Obscura, Camera Lucida, Amsterdam University Press.

De Oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton and Harris Rackman (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1942)

Marcus Fabius Quintilian’s rendition of the subject is laid out in his Institutio oratoria, vol. 4, trans. H. E. Butler (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1922), pp. 221-23

Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 59-60.

Erasmus, Epistolae, ed. P. S. Allen, et al., vol. 9, p. 479. Cited in Yates, The Art of Memory, p. 132.

201904151314 Camera Obscura, Camera Lucida

Annette Michelson

Malcolm Turvey – Introduction {Allen:2003ku}

Mid 1960s Creating a ‘crisis of criticism’

  1. Creating a ‘crisis of criticism’
    • 새롭게 따오르는 미니멀리스트 조각, 필름, 그리고 댄스, Michelson diagnosed this ‘crisis of criticism’ to be the result of what she called Minimalism’s ‘apodictic’ character (RM 13; AP 56), which resisted the traditional ‘critical techniques’ of ‘aesthetic metaphor, gesture, or statement’ (RM 13).
    • 데리다를 미국에 소개시킴과 함께 시작된
    • 그리하여 떠오른 새로운 방식의 필요성 In order to do justice to Minimalism’s ‘resistance to semantic function’ (AP 55), a whole new repertory of technique and conceptual frameworks were needed by critics.
    • 대표적으로 분석한 the three major Minimalist media: Morris (sculpture, 1969), Michael Snow (film, 1971), Yvonne Rainer (dance, 1974).
    • Idealist (관념론자) ➡ Pollock or a Kline 과 다른 Minimalism (more general trend toward questioning the ‘sovereignty’ of subjectivity that was also evident in contemporary French thought.
    • 큐브릭에 대한 해석 “Bodies in Space. {Michelson:1969ti}”
  2. 미니멀리즘을 이해하기 위한 크리틱의 한계점을 극복하기 위한 새로운 아트에 대한 이해, 새로운 해석의 파라다임 을 주장.
    • “for us, after all, the conditions of experience, of perception and apperception, eliciting, within our culture, a response to those perceptions which is cognitive. Our perception of the work of art informs us of the nature of consciousness. This is what we mean when we say – as I do say – that, although art no longer means or refers, it does have a deeply cognitive function. (Michelson, A., 1979. About Snow. October, 8, p 57.)
    • 모리스의 작업은 관습적인 미학적인 관점의 ‘synthesized virtual space’ 로서의 조각 오브젝트와 비미학적인 ‘operational’ 공간으로의 뮤지엄과 갤러리 — 혹은 어떤 실재 환경 “ we live and act” — 와의 구별을 전복 시킨다.

Box with the Sound of its Own Making” by Robert Morris

  • 미쉘슨이 주장한 모리스의 작업”Corner Piece”은 스펙테이터에게 질문을 던지고 있다. 시간성은 “인간의 인지와 미적경험의 컨디션 혹은 미디엄이며”, “안다 (퐁티의 말을 빌려)”라는 것은 몸이 주어진 환경에서 작용한다는 것이다.”
    • Vertov의 Man with a Movie Camera은 또한 is to transform his camera ‘from a Magician into an Epistemologist,’ from a tool of illusion into a tool of enlightenment, through a ‘revelation, an exposure of the terms and dynamics of cinematic illusionism.’ MM
    • 미쉘슨의 성취엔 새로운 “해석 interpretation”에만 있지 않다 ( ➡ art is conceived of as prompting reflection on philosophical topics on the part of the spectator, was invented by her ex nihilo ➡ 서양적 해석 ➡ enlightenment 의 관점에서 나온 해석: true knowlege는 그 자신에 대한 질문에서 나오며 아트는 “질문”하는 것에 도움을 준다).
    • for example, see it as a broadening of Brechtian (art is conceived of as occasioning in the spectator a reflection on socio-political realities ) and Greenbergian (medium-specific properties) ‘reflexive’ models of art.
    • 미쉘슨 has shown that art can potentially do a lot more than ‘express’ the ‘personality’ of its author.
    • Bordwell 의 질문: 무엇이 미적 지각과 비미적 종류들을 구별하는가? ‘What, then, distinguishes aesthetic perception and cognition from the nonaesthetic variety?
      In our culture, aesthetic activity deploys such skills for nonpractical ends. In experiencing art, instead of focusing on the pragmatic results of perception, we turn our attention to the very process itself. What is nonconscious in everyday mental life becomes consciously attended to’ (Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985], p. 33)”.
    • 미쉘슨은 Modernism의 특정 모델에 주목한다. one in which the function of advanced art is of necessity to philosophise due to modernism’s ‘elevation of doubt to an esthetic principle’ (CK 59)
    • 이 모델은 두가지 form의 구별에 영향을 받았다.
      ‘secular’ type (accepts the impossibility of theological or metaphysical certainty as the modern condition) ‘religious’ or ‘idealist’ type (searches for aesthetic substitutes for the theological certainties lost in a secular age.)
    • 이 모델에 따르면, 모더니스트들의 리얼리즘과 19세기 중반의 “모방”에 대한 거부는 크리스챤에서 secular 사회로의 전환으로 인한 ‘서양의 형이상학의 침몰’의 결과였다.
    • 결국 모더니스트들은 정해진 모방적인 질서적인 리얼리티에 대해 더 이상 관심이 없었다. 대신 그들은 지각안의 the nature of reality, the nature of consciousness을 주제로 삼았다.
    • 이 모델은 추상 표현주의 ➡

Cinema

  • has seemed to almost every major avant-garde movement to instantiate its aspirations:

There is a special sense in which almost all the major authentic movements and styles of this century – Futurism, Surrealism, Dadaism, Constructivism – reacted to the growth of cinema. Each fresh revision of esthetic and social values staked its claim upon film, claiming as well that its aspirations and energies subsumed and articulated a filmic ontology. Thus [for example], the early developments of montage spoke to Surrealists as the conjoining of disparate objects in the synthesis of Lautréaumont’s Encounter, rendering concrete and vivid that Encounter as the primary mode of consciousness. (RH 49-50)

  • Cinema’s freedom — freedom to question, like the philosopher or scientist, the order of things, a freedom rooted in the ‘crisis in the Western metaphysical tradition,’ best allows the artist to philosophise, to ‘elevate doubt to an aesthetic principle,’ to question ‘the nature of reality, the nature of consciousness in and through perception.’

Cinema reintroduces not only ‘lived reality,’ but an entirely new and seemingly limitless range of structural relationships allowing for the reconciliation of ‘lived reality’ with ‘artistic form’. (CK 58-59)

  • 미쉘슨은 시네마가 관객을 모더니스트들이 다른 미디아에서 이끌어오던 철학적 주제를 가장 잘 고무 시킬수 있는 미디엄이라고 보았다.
    Cinema is the preeminent modernist medium
  • Bordwell 그녀는 의해 아방가르드 시네마는 모던 아트 크리틱과 역사의 한 부분으로 연구 되는데 도움을 주었으며 그녀는 반드시 모더니즘의 콘텍스트 안에서 해석 해야한다고 믿었다. Bordwell again, ‘her philosophically informed essays [have] helped make the study of avant-garde film part of modern art criticism and history. ’
  • 그러나 스트럭쳐리스트는 소쉬르의 언어적 이론을 기반으로 하고 있으므로 미쉘슨 시대의 아트를 해석하기엔 적합하지 않다고 생각했다.
  • According to Michelson, however fashionable, Structuralist theory, rooted in Saussurian linguistics, was unsuitable for the criticism of advanced art of the moment, because of that art’s apodicity, its resistance to ‘any notion of code and message in [its] stubborn claim for autonomy, immediacy, and absoluteness’ (AS 51).

  • There are cinematic works which present themselves as analogues of consciousness in its constitutive and reflexive modes, as though inquiry into the nature and processes of experience had found in this century’s art form, a striking, a uniquely direct presentational mode. The illusionism of the new, temporal art reflects and occasions reflection upon, the conditions of knowledge; it facilitates a critical focus upon the immediacy of experience in the flow of time. (TS 172)

  • 미쉴슨이 주로 연구 했던 필름 메이커들은 Snow, Cornell, Duchamp, Rainer, Eisenstein, Warhol
  • For example, the reason she views Snow’s Wavelength as a ‘masterpiece’ is, in part, because of the fact that it is a ‘grand metaphor for narrative form’ (TS 175; 176), thereby overcoming the rupture between narrative and non-narrative.

  • Vertov: The function of Three Songs of Lenin, according to Michelson, is ‘not only to commemorate’ Lenin, but to ‘definitively inter’ him, ‘to block the return of the dead (the stone set over the grave to impede the corpse’s return’ (KI 38). It ‘inserts, within our experience of lived time, the extratemporality of death’ through slow motion and freeze-frame (KI 32):
  • Eisenstein(secular) and Vertov(idealist) : Both employ the cinema to escape ordinary human perception and conscious- ness, but they do so with the eminently secular intention of helping human beings to gain greater knowledge about, and thereby mastery over, reality.

Modernism

  • 그녀의 matyoure work는 미니멀리스트와 (Morris, Riner) 시작했지만, 그녀는 한가지 부분을 idealist와 공유했다. : the desire for transcendence, for escape from the limits of the merely human, the earthly, the corporeal, the ordinary, the ‘here and now,’ in search of forms of certainty and knowledge unavailable in quotidian human existence. (WH 62)
  • Vertov 와 Eisenstein을 idealist와 secular의 갭을 이어주는 것으로 볼 수 있다. 모더니스트의 1920의 에덴 ‘the revolutionary aspirations of the modernist movement in literature and the arts on the one hand, and of a Marxist or Utopian tradition on the other.’ 을 바랬다. greater knowledge of and power over reality,
  • 그런 이유로 the journal she starts with Rosalind Krauss in 1976 after Eisenstein’s film October, a work that celebrates the ‘manner in which aesthetic innovation may be a vector in the process of social change’ (AO 3).
  • The cinema, Michelson argues, was the last and most powerful of the ‘philosophical toys’ of a bygone era (OE), ones that grant their users a ‘ludic sovereignty’ over the universe, or features of it, such as the laws of space and time (WH 65).

Comment:

우리가 보는 곳과 우리가 생활하는 곳 그리고 우리가 반응하는 것이 동일화 되었을 때. 그곳이 바로 real이 아닌가?


Reference:

Allen, R. & Turvey, M., 2003. Camera Obscura, Camera Lucida, Amsterdam University Press.

AS ‘About Snow,’ October 8 (Spring 1979), pp. 111-25.

AP ‘Art and the Structuralist Perspective,’ in On the Future of Art (New York: Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, a Viking Compass Book, 1970), pp. 37-59.

AO: 1976. About October. October, 1, pp.3–5.

CK: Michelson, A., 1969. Bodies in Space. Artforum, 7, pp.1–32. Available at: https://www.artforum.com/print/196902/bodies-in-space-film-as-carnal-knowledge-36517.

CL ‘Camera Lucida/Camera Obscura,’ Artforum XI, no. 5 (January 1973), pp. 30-37.

FR: ‘Film and the Radical Aspiration’ (1966), reprinted in Film Culture Reader, ed. P. Adams Sitney (New York: Praeger, 1970; reprinted New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), pp. 404-22.

KI: Michelson, A., 1990. The Kinetic Icon in the Work of Mourning: Prolegomena to the Analysis of a Textual System. October, 52, p.16.

OE: ‘On the Eve of the Future: The Reasonable Facsimile and the Philosophical Toy,’

October 29 (Summer 1984), pp. 3-20.

RM: Robert Morris: The Aesthetic of Transgression, exhibition catalogue (WashingtonD.C.: Corcoran Gallery of Art, 1969), pp. 7-75.

TS ‘Toward Snow (Part I),’ Artforum IX, no. 10 (June 1971), pp. 30-37.

WH:

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