2021-06-02-write the comma

In retrospect, it made me feel like challenging running. So many things happened altogether and changed from all different perspectives. I run too hard but still not satisfied with what I have now. Maybe that’s my way of dealing with a tough life. I run, and I’m still running.

I had some dreams, the dreams that showed me what would happen otherwise. Well, it’s all my dream, fantasy, a possibility from my brain, my logical brain in its own law, so anything possible if that shares the same ground as I experienced in real life. That’s, I believe, the nature in the concept of the future. I run a whole year without actually cleaned out remains and toward forwarding only, so maybe those dreams mean that I need to reorganise the things before I move on to the possibles. In this first year, I wanted to achieve something other than academic, and I think I got 1/5 of that, still a long way to go.

I will restart my short writings here and plan what I want to make for the next. But all before that, I do want some real rest. Maybe a week or two, I want to watch films and read some casual readings. I was thinking of starting YouTube, but I’m not sure what YouTube about. Maybe I can make videos about what I am learning now.

I think this kind of short writings might be good for refreshing the new round.

202012251332—Close-up and Cinema 클로즈업과 시네마

Main Reference: Mary Ann Doane, ‘The Close-up: Scale and Detail in the Cinema’, Differences, 14.3 (2003), 89–111 https://doi.org/10.1215/10407391-14-3-89.
Tags: #cinema #Montage #Eisenstein #Epstein

Reference at the front from Main reference, at the end from second reference

90 엡스테인

  • 가장 오래된 필름 이론중의 하나인 (프랑스 인상주의 1920년에 시작된)
    • 언어를 초과하기에 가장 시네마적으로 인식되었던 photogénie ➡︎ theoretically incoherent
    • which exceeds language and hence points to the very essence of cinematic specificity.
  • 엡스테인에게 그것은 시네마의 행위적 규범에 속박되어있었다.
    • For Epstein “I would describe as photogenic any aspect of things, beings or souls whose moral character is enhanced by filmic reproduction” (Bonjour 20).
    • it transforms the face, reserved as the very locus of subjectivity into a series of harsh and alien objects.
    • 어떤 관객도 거대한 디테일, 우연성들(contingencies), 특이성들을 살펴보도록 초대된다.
    • The close-up is always, at some level, an autonomous entity, a fragment, a “for-itself.”
      • totality
  • (내 예시)
  • Jean Epstein, Le Lion des Mogols, Jean Epstein, 1924, Provenant de la collection : La Cinémathèque française
  • Epstein’s extravagant language, perhaps unconsciously and certainly despite the invocation of morality, delineates the close-up as a lurking danger, a potential semiotic threat to the unity and coherency of the filmic discourse.
    • 가장 많이 쓰이는 클로즈업은 = 얼굴 the face, fragments the body, decapitating it

91-93 Semiotic role of the close-up

  • 이러한 공간을 다 써버린 얼굴들과 오브젝트들은 시간의 순간들로 일직선적 시간의 내러티브로 펼쳐진다.
    • Space is “used up” by the face or object, and the time of the moment, the time of Epstein’s contemplation, is expanded at the expense of the linear time of narrative.

들뢰즈와 다이아그램 그리고 클로즈업

  • Gilles Deleuze, citing Béla Balázs, claims that “the close-up does not tear away its object from a set of which it would form part, of which it would be a part, but on the contrary it abstracts it from all spatio-temporal co-ordinates, that is to say it raises it to the state of Entity” (95–96).
    • 들뢰즈의 경우 (벨라 발라즈를 예시로) 클로즈업은 한 부분으로 귀속되어있던 오브젝트에서 찢겨나오는 것이아닌 오히려 그것은 그 오브젝트를 시공간의 좌표를 추상화하여 state of Entity 로 상승시킨다.
    • Gilles Deleuze, Cinema I: The Movement-Image, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Bloomsbury Revelations, Paperback edition (London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018), p. 106.
  • 클로즈업은 시네마틱 차이점과 특수성으로 자주 나타난다.
    • 발라즈에게 클로즈업은 예술필름의 기술적 조건 “the technical condition of the art of film” (qtd. in Aumont 84)
    • 엡스테인에게 클로즈업은 시네마의 영혼 Epstein described the close-up as the “soul of the cinema” (“Magnification” 9)
    • 세르게이 에이젠슈테인에게 있어서 For Sergei Eisenstein, close-up is a crucial element of montage, the close-up was the support of an intellectual, critical cinema.
      • argued for the disengagement of the close-up from reality, criticizing Griffith for his inability to abstract, to get beyond the “narrowly representational” (Film243).
        • Here is the same defect again: an inability to abstract a phe­nomenon, without which it cannot expand beyond the nar­rowly representational. For this reason we could not resolve any “supra-representational,” “conveying” (metaphorical) tasks.
          • Sergei M. Eisenstein, Film Form: Essays in Film Theory, trans. by Jay Leyda, A Harvest Book, 153 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1977), 243.
      • The function of the close-up in the Soviet cinema was “not so much to showor to presentas to signify, to give meaning, to designate (238).
      • 리얼에서 찢어내어 “absolute changes in the dimensions of bodies and objects on the screen” (Eisenstein, Au-delà229)
      • “[T]he laws of cinematographic perspective are such that a cockroach filmed in close-up appears on the screen one hundred times more formidable than a hundred elephants in medium-long shot” (112).
  • 에이젠슈테인과 다른 이들이 지적했듯, 컨셉은 용여체계 nomenclature에 따라 다르게 해석되곤 한다.
    • Russian and French ➡︎ 크기 largeness or large scale (fros plan)
      • it is thought as a quality of the image, as extensiveness, scale, an imposing stature, the awe of the gigantic as opposed to the charm of the miniature.
      • the Russian and French terms reject possession in favor of transcendence (the image is truly “larger than life”), a scale that guarantees unattainability.
        • Extras: Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection, 1st paperback ed (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
    • English ➡︎ 거리 nearness or proximity
      • In the American context, it is conceptualized in terms of point of view, perspective, the relation between spectator and image, the spectator’s placein the scene, and an assumed identification between viewer and camera.
  • 벤야민 Benjamin 에게 클로즈업은 재생산된 이미지를 소유하고자 하는 욕망과 맞닿아있다. possession, possessiveness, the desire to “get hold of an object”
    • the desire of contemporary masses to bring things “closer” spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accept- ing its reproduction. Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction. (“Work of Art” 223)
  • Metz ➡︎ 언어학적 접근이 유행했던 1970년대 유사과학적 접근을 했던 크리스티앙 메츠의 경우 초기 필름 이론에서의 우쭐되던 클로즈업에 대한 해석은 사라진다. 대신 언어학적 시테마의 유닛으로 남는다.
    • and hence why the cinema is always speech—paroleversus langagein Saussure’s terms
      • The image isalways actualized. Moreover, even the image— fairly rare, incidentally—that might, because of its content, correspond to a “word” is still a sentence: This is a particular case, and a particularly revealing one. A close-up of a revolver does not mean “revolver” (a purely virtual lexical unit), but at the very least, and without speaking of the connotations, it signifies “Here is a revolver!” It carries with it a kind ofhere (a word which André Martinet rightly considers to be a pure index of actualization).
        • Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema, University of Chicago Press ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 67.

94 anthropomorphic close-up

  • For Balázs 발라즈에게 클로즈업은 오브젝트이건 인간 얼굴이건 anthropomorphic .
    • “When the film close-up strips the veil of our imperceptiveness and insensitivity from the hidden little things and shows us the face of objects, it still shows us man, for what makes objects expressive are the human expressions projected on to them. The objects only reflect our own selves.
    • “This most subjective and individual of human manifestations is rendered objective in the close-up” (60).
      • 이것은 특히나 무성영화에서 더 강하게 나타나며 인간과 오브젝트 모두 똑같이 homogeneous 픽처, 사진적 재료들로 같은 스크린에 나타난다.
  • according to Aumont, is “the operation which produces a surface that is sensible and legible at the same time, which produces, as Deleuze says, an Entity” (85).
    • The close-up transforms whatever it films into a quasi-tangible thing, producing an intense phenomenological experience of presence, and yet, simultaneously, that deeply experienced entity becomes a sign, a text, a surface that demands to be read. This is, inside or outside of the cinema, the inevitable opera- tion of the face as well.
    • Deleuze formulates even more extreme
      • “As for the face itself, we will not say that the close-up deals with [traite] it or subjects it to some kind of treatment: there is no close-up of the face, ~the face is itself close-up~, the ~close-up is by itself face and both are affect, affection image~ ” (88)

95 Universal language and close-up

  • (96) Almost all theories of the face come to terms in some way with this opposition between surface and depth, exteriority and interiority.
    • the face constitutes a kind of universal language, and Balázs refers to the “universal comprehensibility of facial expression and gesture” (44–45).
      • Béla Balázs, Theory of the Film: Character and Growth of a New Art (New York: Dover Publications, 1970).
      • Extra: Béla Balázs, ‘Close-Up’, in Béla Balázs: Early Film Theory: Visible Man and the Spirit of Film, ed. by Erica Carter, trans. by Rodney Livingstone, Film Europa : German Cinema in an International Context, 10 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 37–45.
  • Traditionally, according to Deleuze, the face has been given three roles:
    1. as the privileged site of individualization (it embodies each person’s uniqueness);
    2. as the manifestation of social role or social type;
    3. as the primary tool of intersubjectivity, of relation to or commu- nication with the other (this also refers to an adequate, mimetic relation, within the individual, between face and character or role).
  • This understanding of the face requires that it be completely detached from ordinary notions about its social semiotics.
  • The close-up pushes us beyond the realm of individuation, of social role, and of the exchange that underlies intersubjectivity.
  • Yet, there is simultaneously a strong denial that cinematic specificity is at work here—the face and the close-up are equated in the arguments of Deleuze, Aumont, and even Balázs. Inevitably, these analyses (particularly those of Epstein and Balázs) produce nostalgia for the silent cinema, since it is the face that speaks there, and speaks to us (rather than to other characters) so much more eloquently when mute.
    • 그러나, 동시에 영화 적 특이성이 여기에 작동한다는 강한 부정이있다 – 얼굴과 클로즈업은 델뢰즈, 오몬트, 심지어 발라즈에게 있어서동일시된다.

98 Examples

  • (For Epstein) Sessue Hayakawa’s face In Cecil B. De Mille’s 1915 The Cheat – Given the stony immobility of his face, a slight twitch of an eyebrow could convey extraordinary significance.
  • Rouben Mamoulian, Queen Christina, 1933.
  • Alfred Hitchcock, Sabotage, 1936.


The legibility of all three instances of the close-up is intimately linked to their very lackof autonomy.


  • However, I am not confirming here the banal argument that the close-up must always be read in context and that therefore film theory’s espousal of the idea of its autonomy, its unavoidable despatialization, is simply wrong.
    • why the marked discrepancy between theory’s excessive concentration on the close-up’s extractability from all spatiotemporal coordinates, its production of a hitherto unknown dimension, and its practice within specific films?
      • I would argue that it has a great deal to do with an implicit politics of cinematic scale, most visibly incarnated in the close-up.
      • A number of theorists attempt to elaborate a politics of the close-up or a politics of the face
      • According to Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, “The face is a politics [. . .]. Certain assemblages of power require the production of a face, others do not [. . .]. The reason is simple. The face is not a universal. It is not even that of the white man; it is White Man himself, with his broad white cheeks and the black hole of his eyes” (181, 175–76).
        • Face = White Man
          • The societies that do not require the production of a face are (predictably enough) primitive societies, societies that are “collective, polyvocal, and corporeal” as opposed to signifying and subjective. They do not operate through the face but through the body, bringing into play heterogeneous forms and substances.
      • For Aumont, on the other hand, the face has operated as the very location of the human since it, ~together with the voice~, allow us a privileged access to the humanity of the other.

106 Detail and despatialisation

  • The only film theorist who situates the politics of the close-up in relation to the question of scale is Eisenstein, with his emphasis on the superiority of the Russian term—large scale or large shot—to that of the English—close-up. [[202012251645—Eisenstein and Close-up]]
    • the close-up is most significantly the close-up of objects, not of the human face:
    • The representation of objects in the actual (absolute) proportions proper to them is, of course, merely a tribute to orthodox formal logic. A subordination to an inviolable order of things [. . .]. Absolute realism is by no means the correct form of perception. It is simply the function of a certain form of social structure. (Film 34–35)
  • Balázs – Balázs, who embraces the defamiliarization argument, also argues that the close-up is not a detail because there is no whole from which it is extracted. The space of the narrative, the diegesis, is constructed by a multiplicity of shots that vary in terms of both size and angle—hence this space exists ~nowhere~; ~there is no totality of which the close-up could be a part~. And certainly if one accepts the theories of the close-up’s despatialization, it cannot be defined as a detail, since it occupies the only space there is, constituting itself as its own whole or totality, abolishing off-screen space.
    • Extra: Invagination ➡︎ Jacques Derrida, ‘The Law of Genre’, trans. by Avital Ronell, Critical Inquiry, 7.1 (1980), 55–81.
  • 이야기 안에서는: ~In the diegesis,~ that fictional space produced by the film, the close-up—despite Balázs’s denial—will always ~constitute a detail~, a part.
  • 관람객의 공간에서는: Yet, ~in the spectator’s space~, that of the theater, the close-up will, even if only momentarily, constitute ~itself as the totality~, the only entity there to be seen.
    • 30년간의 필름 연구에서 관람객의 공간을 없애기 위해 노력해왔다. 그렇기에 클로즈업은 자율적인 실채로 face of the closed
      • (108) Three decades of film theory have insisted that the classical cinematic text works to annihilate this space of the spectator—to suggest that the only world is that on the screen. Hence, the embrace of the close-up as autonomous entity by Balázs, Deleuze, and especially Epstein, is an attempt to salvage spectatorial space, to reaffirm its existence and its relevance in the face of the closed, seamless space of the film.


  • In the close-up, the cinema plays simultaneously with the desire for totalization and its impossibility.
  • Its unspeakability is no doubt linked to the desire to make it a corporeal experience, a matter of touching, feeling, tasting, as well as seeing. Yet, the historical trajectory of classical cinema was to defeat that body by annihilating its space, its ability to act as a measure of scale. Photogénieis usually referred to as one of the earliest examples of cinéphilia, a love of the cinema that insists upon its uniqueness and its ability to induce a form of incomparable ecstasy.

202007052120 — Deleuze and Diagram

Reference: Ben van Berkel and Caroline Bos, ‘Diagrams: Interactive Instruments in Operation’, in This Is Not Architecture: Media Constructions (London; New York: Routledge, 2002)

  • Architecture still articulates its concepts, design decisions and processes almost exclusively by means of a posteriori rationalisations.
  • The compulsive force of legitimising arguments still dominates contemporary debate,
  • Since architecture – at least in the open, democratic, Western society in which we work – now results from a highly institutionalised, cooperative process in which clients, investors, users and technical consultants all take part, ➡︎ 이건 건축만은 아닐 것이다.
  • The frustrating result is that there is hardly any real architectural theory to be found, despite the diversity of practices at work today and despite a hugely expanded volume of architectural publications. There is only after-theory.

건축 스케치의 종류

  • 버블 다이아그램 for relationship mapping (space and its function)
  • Designing the outer form of the built environment
  • figure ground (Black and white) for volumetric analysis

Architecture as social discursive practice

  • Looking into diagrammatic procedures is one way to partially open that door and to dislocate the protective and constrictive barriers that architecture has raised to hide its vulnerable centre.
  • a diagrammatic technique presents an opportunity to examine the social-discursive aspect of architectural practice from within.
    • 이것이 꼭 소셜 디스커시브인걸까? Relation discursive 가 될 수 있지 않을까?
  • Their function is to regulate production, consumption and distribution of texts within a particular field of interest. Discursive practices cannot very well be seen as separate from the social framework in which they take place,
    • ::이 부분에서 주장이 조금 튼튼하지 않아보이는 것에 대해서 한번 써보는 것은 나쁘지 않을듯.::
  • The challenge for the next generation of architects is to acknowledge and analyse the internal discourse, which from a social- discursive viewpoint is far more comprehensive than the methodological process that is the basis of current design practice, and to find a theory of the real in that.
  • There are different interpretations of the diagram, which occupy different positions on the sliding scale between subjectivity and objectivity.
  • its imagery and the ways in which it instrumentalises concepts of organisation.3

Meaning of the diagram

  • More to the point is the general understanding of the diagram as a statistical or schematic(개요 도식적인) image.
  • In its most basic and historical definition, the diagram is understood as a visual tool designed to convey ‘as much information in five minutes as would require whole days to imprint on the memory’. ::4::
    • * J. Krausse, ‘Information at a Glance: On the History of the Diagram’, OASE(SUN Nijmegen, 1998). Krausse here quotes William Playfair, architect of the contemporary diagram, whose book The Commercial and Political Atlas(1786) introduced economic curve diagrams and bar charts.
  • ::Diagrams are best known and understood as reductive machines for the compression of information.::
  • 최근 건축에서 다이아그램의 사용법
    • diagrams can also be used as proliferating machines.
    • thus transforming the diagram’s conventional significance.
    • For architecture,
    • the diagram conveys an unspoken essence, disconnected from an ideal or an ideology, that is random, intuitive, subjective, not bound to a linear logic, that can be physical, structural, spatial or technical.
    • architecture has been encouraged by the writ- ing of Gilles Deleuze, who described the virtual organisation of the diagram as an abstract machine.

들뢰즈의 압스트랙 머신

  • Architecture similarly oscillates between the world of ideas and the physical world,
  • Deleuze offers at least three versions of the diagram:
    • via Michel Foucault,
    • via Francis Bacon and
    • via Marcel Proust.
  • 이들 사이의 차이점을 알아보고자 하는 거서이 아니다.
    • Instead of recognising three ‘versions’ of the diagram, we should instead speak of moods or tonalities, for what strikes us is that three deeply significant aspects of the diagram are conveyed in three very different modes.
    • 다른 스테이지들
      1. Associated with Foucault: how the figure of the diagram is not representational.
        1. Panopticon is ‘the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form … a figure of political technology’. ::5::
          1. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
        2. It conveys the spatial organisation of a specific form of state power and discipline.
        3. cannot be reduced to a singular reading; ::like all diagrams, the Panopticon is a manifold.::
        4. Typically, when a diagram breeds new meanings these are still directly related to its substance; its tangible manifestation.
        5. ::Critical readings of previous interpretations are not diagrammatic.::
        6. a diagram is a diagram because it is stronger than its interpretations.
        7. Foucault introduced the notion of the diagram as an assemblage of situations, techniques and functionings made solid, he put the emphasis more on the strategies that form the diagram than on its actual format.
        8. For him, the diagram is interesting not as a paradigmatic example of a disciplinary technology, but as an abstract machine that ‘[makes no] distinction within itself between a plane of expression and a plane of content’. ::6::
          1. Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 141.
        9. ‘The diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come.’ ::7::
          1. Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (unpublished manuscript), p. 55. [Since the original publication of the present essay, this has been published (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).]
        10. it is about ‘the real that is yet to come’.
      2. Bacon; as we mentally take up the paintbrush we simultaneously engage in an earthy and lighthearted, playful debate about the selection and application of the diagram
      3. Proust; the interaction of time and matter is introduced, without which there can be no transformation. 여기서는 뮤지컬 턴,

Tools against typologies, 클리쉐와의 싸움

  • 리프레젠테션 테크닉은 implies 우리가 컨셉츄얼 포지션에서 리얼리티에 집중하여 아이디어와 폼의 관계를 고정시키도록 한다. A representational technique implies that we converge on reality from a conceptual position and in that way fix the relationship between idea and form, between content and structure.
    • it cannot escape existing typologies 유형학, 표상 상징.
  • An instrumentalising technique such as the diagram delays typological fixation.
    • How this is done is a trivial question for many techniques, but a vital one for what we call an instrumentalising technique ➡︎ The role of the diagram is to delay typology and advance a design by bringing in external concepts in a specific shape: ::as figure, not as image or sign.:: ➡︎ 베이컨?
      • ‘is a violent chaos in relation to figurative givens, but is a germ of rhythm in relation to the new order of painting’. ::8::
        • * Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, p. 55.
      • 들뢰즈에 따르면 페인팅은 언제나 클리쉐와의 싸움을 마주한다. perpetual (영원한) fight
      • even the reactions against clichés are creating clichés.’ ::9::
        • * Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, p. 49.
    • The selection and application of a diagram has a certain directness.

Instrumentalising the diagram 기구화[도구화]하다

  • 베이컨은 꼴라쥬를 통해 직접적으로 unmediated 클리쉐를 방해하지 않고 대신 instrumentalist effectuated 했다.
  • At this point the third meaning of the diagram, which confirms and facilitates the previous two, emerges: the triggering of the abstract machine. The abstract machine must be set in motion for the transformative process to begin,
    • 어떻게 다이아그램을 움직이게 하나? 어떻게 압스트랙 머신이 triggered되나?
      • Deleuze offers an indication by pointing at the novelistic treatment of time. Through Proust’s novel run, long lines of musicality, passion, pictoriality and other narrative lines that coil around lack roles within the story,
      • What exactly is the principle that effectuated the changes and thus formation that we find in real life and real time? Furthermore, how can we isolate this principle and render it to the dimensions that make it possible to grasp and use at will?

Faciality: the operational dream.

  • 이 글에서 어떻게 프루스트의 블랙홀을 건축학적 다이아그램에 적용시킬 수 있는가 질문한다.
    • One of our current projects is structured as a diagram of faciality.

      Klein bottle


  • The abstract machine in motion is a discursive instrument;
    • it is both a product and a generator of dialogical actions which serve to bring forth new, unplanned, interactive meanings.
    • Discourse theory introduces the notion that meanings are not transferred from one agent to another but are constituted in the interaction between the two agents. Likewise, the architectural project is created in this intersubjective field.
  • Diagrams, rich in meaning, full of potential movement, loaded with structure, turn out to be located in a specific place after all.
  • Understood as activators that help trigger constructions that are neither objective nor subjective, neither before-theory nor after-theory, neither conceptual not opportunist,
  • ::the location of the diagram is in the intersubjective, durational and operational field where meanings are formed and transformed interactively.::















Where is My World?

In my childhood, computer game was a fixed space, without time or location. There was an event, and game items, but it was a fixed spacetime. During the game, I was able to divide the space inside the computer and the real physical space. As much physical time was frozen, computer game space was frozen as well, despite flowing and moving images. One event or one story continued endlessly, and spacetime repeated until my character beat the last monster where the character died again and again. It was a space of the death rather than a space to survive. The endless death represented the passage of time, and how many hours of character life has left represented how much time has passed.
We now watch the movie through computers, mobile phones, or other devices like the iPad. But movie space is no different. Even though there is no room for me to interrupt in the movie, except little mouse and remote control (but can we say it is real interruption? Even in the movie theatre, I can just rush out from the black box) through ending credits, I can feel that one event has ended and another block of time has passed.
The events never end. The small spaces are repeated without end.
Perhaps this is where my research question began. How many pieces of events, time, and space can coexist? How can this schizophrenic space have a relationship or construction? If I am no longer just an observer but an active user or producer, where is my position in this network?
The start was perhaps mechanical eyes, as Dziga Vertov’s work, it was camera vision, giving the third gaze to the division of culture and nature. Through the mechanical eyes, the human world is no longer culture, and no wild animal world is nature, and two worlds are merged as a third spacetime on the screen. It is not the question of real or virtual anymore, but how many worlds we have or we can have now. As much human exist on the earth new world is created. Then, where is my world? What is my world?
I look at my room. My room is the maximum size of the world that I can compose and perceive as a physical reality, that is the limit of the range of action I can perceive. “We no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask” (Cinema 2 7 ). The moment I leave my home, the spacetime of the world is indiscernible its size and scope. The moment I become more than my house, I only reconstruct them through the abstracted notions. If, as Deleuze says, movement-image and time-image have represented time indirectly and directly with the movement of active actants and the observation of actants, I can no longer do both. I’m just looking at a network of relationships that I am part of it.
I recognise the ground that I am standing on, but the relationship with that ground is not connected to how I construct them. The village I live in is not made up of the networks I have created. Postcodes, addresses, and street name indicate how this place connected with the Country, Korea. It has already been set up, and I only can borrow or use that same code to place myself in it.
Isn’t this too passive? What role do I play? Am I not too passive? Will I be satisfied with this set of my position? Will I be happy with the time of piled up characters’ death? How can I construct my time and space?
The practice, for me, is active participation. I do not passively place me on the network. I am concerned. I connect my network. Eisenstein repositioned history. Vertov repositioned the human eye. The two approaches are very different but desires toward the same direction. The two directors pursued a transition from a passive position to an active, and for both, it was reconstruction through the practice of editing. It is Eisenstein’s way of seeing the past, rather than the additive effect from the editing technique that causes emotional ecstasy. He chose to become a producer and observer himself while making films. I am a producer and an observer.

2020-06-19-SEEABLE RELATIONSHIP. SAYABLE CONNECTION. #04: In Search of Lost Time

This post is not organised writing or essay, but the fragmented thought.

In the Dream and In-between

Once the dream was known as the future to come. It shows the messages from the ancestors to warn the dangers or fortunes. Or, it was a desire that is suppressed long time, desired but unachieved affection. Now, it became a common knowledge that dream is just a crumbled memories that made an assemblage by the brain with total anomalous. Yet, we don’t know why we sleep and why we have a dream. Its functionality is still the greatest mystery in human being. Deleuze referencing Marcel Proust’s ~In Search of Lost Time~and analyse as an assemblage, it is qualified as encyclopaedic, non-hierarchal, and self-reflexive qualities, which indicates a systematicity of heterogeneity. If his book is an assemblage of those three qualities, it is not unreasonable to say his book is a ‘dream.’ It is a diagramatised dream. It is not surprising why his book starts with the state of the in-between of dream and reality. His monologue consists of both dimensions.

Once awake and checking the time, and soon he is talking in the dream with an unclear distinction of real and dream. Each dimension contains a different system, the dream has its own, as Deleuze analysed. In the dream, there is random—random in the ‘real dimension’ perspective—figures and relationships. The heterogeneous connections appear and disappears. A stranger became a dearest and passionate lover, and ‘real’ sweetheart became the purest sadness. One thing would be sure that it is self-reflective. Two dimensions are not connected by the fracture of memories, but its connector is the human body. The human body became a mediator of the affection and experience in the dream. That is the only linkage that makes experienced and represented. The self-reflective dream constructs each representation following its own system and that representation created by the conscious experience.

From the viewer’s point of view, the film triggers the affect by receiving moving images through constrained vision, unlike the novel or illustration. It doesn’t give you the freedom to put the connection and restructure the imagery narrative. It doesn’t give you the space to move your body. It is not self-reflective but outer-reflective. Its strong authorship — by the author? Or systemic imagery? — constraint the viewer within their dream, or rather the diagramatised dream. The heterogeneous image structure paralyses the viewer and make them give up their body but live off the screen. Full of freed souls strolling around the screen. Do they know where they are? Do they know where they are heading? As the purpose of the dream is not to make a story or the narrative, film’s primary purpose, I believe, is the spill out the fragmented memories, experience, emotions, sadness, happiness, whatever human being produces following the reflection of the world and other beings. Although, many filmmakers worried remote control that would usurp the throne and distribute to the viewers. Has it really happened? Or haven’t we analysed in the wrong way? The author wasn’t the king or anaesthetic after all. The authorship since modernism, it became an archaic and forgotten term.
But it is same as we killed a man who doesn’t exist.

I will analyse this further in next post.

New Questions

  • What is the phenomenology in the dream and imagery?
  • How does condition of diagram?
  • Is diagram a both figure and background? content and form?

202004032042 — Why Gesture

Reference: Church, R. Breckinridge, Martha W. Alibali, and Spencer D. Kelly, eds., Why Gesture?: How the Hands Function in Speaking, Thinking and Communicating, Gesture Studies (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2017), vii https://doi.org/10.1075/gs.7

Gesture Study


  • 제스처 스터디는 20세기쯤부터 고성장 (bourgeoning) 특히나 말을 할때의 역할로서 연구되었다.
  • “window on the mind.” ::Hearing Gesture, Susan Goldin-Meadow (2007):: frequently in a way that reflects an imagistic version of what is being spoken.


  • 아리스토 텔레스는 행위를 일으키는 것과 (what causes a — efficient cause), 행위를 하는 이유 (what behaviour for — final cause)로 나누었다.
  • 산책을 한다고 할때, working metabolic 과 근육 시스템이 efficient cause, 건강이 final cause이다.
  • 이 글에선 what gesture is for가 될것이다.


  • 이 책에서 첫 테마는 제스처에 대해서는 생물학적, 정신학적 그리고 사회적으로 해석해 본다.
  • 두번째 테마로는 제스처의 기능을 모든 시간대의 프레임으로 해석해본다. – moment-to-moment, ontogenetic, and evolutionary
  • 세번째 테마는 the methodology for studying gesture is necessarily varied.


  • Finding that gesture occurs across different contexts and under different task requirements tells us that its functions are multi-faceted and flexible.
  • 네번째 테마는, 제스처의 기능은 producer를 위해서만 기능하지 않고, 보는 사람을 위해서도 작동한다. The gestyoure supports speech to enhance internal activities of the speaker, such as thinking and language production, while simultaneously supporting speech to enhance communication to listeners, influencing the listener’s thinking and language comprehension.

398-401 (Neurological evidence Analysis)

401- (Psychological evidence Analysis)

  • Gesture appears to be linked with language to support the way spatial information in speech ::(Alibali et al., Chapter 2; Ozyurek, Chapter 3)::
  • As another example, gesture appears to reflect action in a simulated form in problem-solving contexts (Hostetter & Boncoddo, Chapter 7; Nathan, Chapter 8)
  • 특히나 챕터5 에서 McNeill and Lopez-Ozieblo’s
    • Growth Point Theory (GPT):
    • (1) gesture and speech are synchronized;
    • (2) gesture’s format, which is gestalt, 3D, and imagistic, is distinctly different from speech’s format, which is analytic, 2D, and linear;
    • and (3) because these two formats are different, the combination of gesture and speech modalities reflects a more complete version of an idea than either modality alone.


  • De Ruiter의 경우 스피치가 제스처에 영향을 끼친다고 하며 제스처가 스피치의 supplement information으로 (that is redundant with speech)라고 말해지지만 이 책에서의 연구를 통해서 사실 서로가 영향을 받으며,
  • GPT 를 통한 연구는 gestyoure content mirrors speech content, because gesture’s format is 3-D and nonlinear, it is never fully redundant with speech.
  • Gesture provides visuo-spatial information that reflects 3-di- mensional, dynamic, as well as perceptual features (Hostetter et al., Chapter 7).
  • 제스처는 embodied cognition와 연결되어있다.
    • our understanding of concepts may be grounded in the way we physically interact with the world, which is reflected in the way we gesture about the world (Cook & Fenn, Chapter 6; Hostetter et al., Chapter 7; Nathan, Chapter 8; Novack & Goldin- Meadow, Chapter 17; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Alibali & Nathan, 2007; McNeill, 2005; Núñez & Lakoff, 2005)
  • 챕터 17에서 제스처는 특이한 유니크한 폼의 액션이다.
    • 즉 제스처는 어떻게 직접적으로 세상에 영향을 끼치는가에 대한 정보를 담은 직접적으로 세상에 영향을 끼치지 않는 액션이다. it represents information about a direct effect on the world without having a direct affect on the world (e.g., twisting a jar lid results in an open jar in a way that producing a twisting gesture does not; see also Goldin-Meadow, 2015, and Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2016, for discussion).
      • This in betweenplace may serve a particularly important purpose for cognition.
    • However, gesturing about acting on objectsis more likely to lead to generalization and retention than actually acting on objects(see Novack & Goldin-Meadow, Chapter 17 and also Novack, Congdon, Hemani-Lopez & Goldin-Meadow, 2014; and Congdon, Novack, Brooks, Hemani-Lopez, O’Keefe & Goldin-Meadow, under review; Wakefield, Hall, James & Goldin-Meadow, 2017).

404-405 Social Evidence (Chapter11-16)

405- (Gesture Functions in all time frames)


Developmental time frame

Evolutionary time frame

제스처 메카니즘


  • A number of evolutionary perspectives suggest that gesture evolved either as a precursor to spoken language (Bates & Dick, 2002; Corballis, 2002; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Tomasello, 2008) or simultaneously along with it (McNeill, 2012).
  • In addition, there are powerful mechanisms of gesture on the much shorter timeframe of moment-to-moment processing, which spans from seconds to minutes. For example, when people are faced with challenging spatial and motoric tasks, they produce more representational gestures when they speak, than when they face simpler tasks (Alibali, Yeo, Hostetter & Kita, Chapter 2).

제스처의 기능


  • Tinbergen (1963) points out, a behaviour can be functional without being the direct product of some specific evolutionary mechanism.
    • human hands evolved to interact with real objects in the environment, but they were co-opted over time to also serve the communicative function of gesturing about imaginary objects not present in the here and now.
  • The gestures may enhance or disrupt common ground (Nathan, Alibali, & Church, Chapter 13), clarify or confuse an important concept (Singer, Chapter 14)

챕터 2 Representational gesture help speakers package information for speaking p. 15-


  • What role do gestures play in speaking? Current theories of gesture production have three primary foci:
    1. the role of gestures in communicating information,
    2. the role of gestures in producing speech, and
    3. the cognitive processes that give rise to gestures.
  • These distinct perspectives emphasise different aspects of the complex behaviour that we recognize as gesture.


  • We focus in particular on representational gestures, which are movements that represent semantic information via form (handshape), trajectory, or location.
  • 이러한 제스처는 beat 제스처와 다르다. which are motorically simple gestures that manifest aspects of the structure and prosody of speech but do not convey semantic content (McNeill, 1992), and 또한 인터렉티브 제스처와도 다르다, from interactive gestures, which are used to regulate turn-taking and other aspects of interaction among participants in a communicative situation (Bavelas, Chovil, Lawrie, & Wade, 1992).
  • 스피치와 제스처는 다른 기호적 특성을 가진다
    • Gesture: Distinct meanings converge into a single, synthetic gesture.
    • In contrast, speech is analytic and combinatorial, in the sense that the meaning of the whole depends on the meanings of the individual elements.
  • 글로벌과 통합적인 특징으로, gestures are adept at expressing spatial, motoric, and relational information (Alibali, 2005)
  • 이 글은 Information Packaging Hypothesis Kita(2000)에 의해 개발된 메또돌로지를 이용해 분석해본다.

Information Packaging Hypothesis란?

- *Information Packaging Hypothesis* “helps speakers organize rich spatio-motoric information into packages suitable for speaking” (Kita, 2000, p. 163) 
- 키타에 따르면 공간-동적(spatio-motoric) 생각은 “alternative informational organization that is not readily accessible to analytic thinking” (p. 163) 


  • 키타의와 몰(2012)의 의견에 경우
    • In later work, Kita and Özyürek (2003) further specified this process in their Interface Model, which holds that gesture production and speech production processes are linked bidirectionally. 스피치와 제스처 사이엔 익스체인지가 일어남.
    • Through this process, gesture and speech converge in content; more specifically, gestures encode information equivalent to the infomation speech encodes within a processing unit for utterance formation (roughly a clause for adult speakers) (Mol & Kita, 2012).
  • 이 생각은 다른 두개의 컨템 스피치 속 제스처에 대한 의견과 반대된다.
    1. First, the Lexical Retrieval(회복) Hypothesis (Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000): – Briefly, gestures activate spatial-dynamic features of concepts, which in turn feed activation to lexical items, facilitating speakers’ retrieval of those lexical items.
    2. Second, the Image Activation Hypothesis(de Ruiter, 1998; Wesp, Hesse, Keutmann, & Wheaton, 2001). gestures serve to maintain activation on mental images while they are encoded in speech.


- IPH에서 키타가 한 실험.
    - [image:5DDDBD6B-5494-438C-A9C3-0C293094973A-1343-0001218ACC14AD90/Screenshot 2020-04-03 at 22.32.02.png]
- As predicted from the IPH, participants produced more representational gestures (but not more beat gestures) in the hard condition than in the easy condition, while using comparable content in speech. 
- 결과적으로 더 어려운 그림을 설명해야할 때 더 많은 제스처를 사용함

제스처의 제한


- 아이들의 제스처를 제한 시킨뒤 설명을 시켰을때, 
    - 비교문이라던가  (about information that was not perceptually present, such as information about the initial equality of the object), 
    - 아니면 변화 transformation that the experimenter had previously performed.
    - 또는 hypothetical states or transformation (e.g., “if you put these two together, then this would be longer that this”)
- 제스처를 허용했을 경우
    - tended to focus on information that was perceptually present (e.g., “this one’s taller”) 
    - often combination with deictic information with perceptual gesture information.
        - (i.e., a gesture toward one of the task objects that also depicted or highlighted a perceptual feature of the object, such as a flat palm held at the top edge of one of the glasses, to depict the height of the glass) 
- **Thus, prohibiting gestures reduced children’s focus on perceptually available spatio-motoric information in their explanations.** 


- participants who were allowed to gesture expressed a greater percentage of key events with semantically rich verbs than did speakers who could not gesture. This finding is compatible with the view that speakers package information differently when they produce gesture and when they do not. 
- In addition, speakers who could not gesture were more likely to begin units with a filler (i.e., “um,” “uh,” “and,” or “then”) than were speakers who were al- lowed to gesture. 


- (말하기 전 집중용으로) Alibali et al. (2014) argued that the boy’s gesture served to focus his attention on the width of the dish, and highlighted information about width for verbalization. 
- (할 말이 정해진 상태에서 어떻게 말할 것인지 표현할 것인지 possible option를 explore하는 용으로 제스처를 사용) In other cases, speakers’ choices about what information to express are relatively constrained or specified in advance. In such cases, speakers may use gesture to explore possible options for how to express that information. 

챕터 7 (155-)


- As movements of the body, gestures are actions, albeit representational ones that do not actually manipulate the physical environment.  
- gestures provide perceptual experiences 
- Gesture as Simulated Action (GSA) 프레임워크는 
    - which claims that gestures emerge from **perceptual representations** and **links with action** that are formed in the minds of speakers. We then consider how gestures’ relationship to perceptual-motor representations might play a functional role in strengthening those representations in the minds of speakers. 


- Researchers who argue for the **embodiment of cognition** claim 
    - (1) that psychological processes are grounded in the sensorimotor(감각운동) system 
    - and (2) that **action is an integral part of perception** (see Glenberg, Witt, & Metcalfe, 2013 for a review). 
    - Thus, perceptual judgments are not the result of abstract calculations, but involve activation of our own previous, current, and expected sensorimotor experiences.  (간단한 거리 감각에도 얼마나 그 거리에 도달하기까지 에너지가 필요한가에 따라서 더 멀리 느껴지며, 누가 총을 들고 있는가 아닌가는 우리 스스로가 총을 들고 있느냐 아닌가로 판단된다)

157 (GSA의 연구들)

- **The GSA framework** follows the claims of embodied cognition more **generally to assert that when speakers talk about perceptual and motor experiences**, they activate perceptual-motor representations of those experiences, and **these representations reactivate the same neural areas that were involved in actually having or observing those experiences**. 지각적 운동적 경험의 제스처를 할때 실제로 두뇌의 그 부분을 액티베이트시킨다.


- For example, speakers gesture more when they are describing spatial or motoric information than when they are describing abstract information (Alibali, 2005). 


- Hostetter (2014) found that speakers gestured at high rates both when describing highly motoric objects (e.g., tools) and when speaking to a listener who could see their gestures. 
- Although the framework is termed Gesture as Simulated *Action*, this should not be taken to imply that the framework excludes gestures that occur with per- ceptual representations (such as thinking about the size or shape of an object). 


- judgments of size and distance of objects are affected by our own past and anticipated experiences with those objects (e.g., Witt & Proffitt, 2005). 
- Moreover, increasing evidence suggests that **viewing an object with a particular shape activates a motor plan for how to grasp or use the object (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008)** as well as a motor plan for **how to trace the shape of the object** (Bach, Griffiths, Weigelt, & Tipper, 2010). 
- It is also not unusual for speakers to gesture as **they describe something that they have only read about** and have not directly experienced. 
    - embodied cognition is that psychological processes are grounded in the sensorimotor system (e.g., Glenberg et al., 2013); such psychological processes include reading. 


- This means that gestures can be thought of as highlighting perceptual-motor representations in two ways. 
    1. Gestures’ perceptual-motor representations’ production signals that a particular kind of representation is formed in the speakers’ mind, mainly one that reactivates the neural experience of the perceptual and motor event the speaker is describing.
    2. The motor plan involved in gesture can strengthen the speakers’ representation, which can affect how easy it is for the speaker to attend to, remember, or describe gestured elements of that representation 

챕터 17(381-


- When we say here that **gestures are representational actions**, we mean that they are meaningful substitutions and analogical stand-ins for ideas, objects, actions, relations, etc. 
- 여기서 **representational** 의 사용은 representational gesture (a category of gestures that look like the ideas and items to which they refer (i.e., iconic and metaphoric gestures) 와 혼동되면 안된다. ➡︎ **apply to all types of nonconventional gestures**, including representational gestures (iconics, metaphorics), deictic gestures (points), and even beat gestures (rhythmic movements closely coordinated with speech). 


- Gesture is *action*in that it involves movements of the body. 
- 하지만 제스처는 다른 방식의 액션이다.
- one that *represents* the world rather than directly impacting the world.

Properties of a Movement to be Identified as a Gesture

382-3 — Processing movement as gesture

- 재현적인 제스처는 비재현적인 제스처와의 구별이 필요하다. 
- 이 부분은 왜 사람들이 움직임을 제스처로 보게 만드는가를 설명한다.
- 첫번째 조건으로는 **빈 손**이다 ➡︎ 하지만 모든 빈 손(춤이나 운동)이 제스처로 인식되진 않는다. ➡︎ However, unlike dance or exercise, the movement itself is *not* the goal of a gesture. 

384 — The unique functions of gesture in communication, problem solving, and learning

- 제스처와 다른 움직임은 인식적으로 분리된다는 benefits가 있다.

Journey to the Seaside and honest back story of my work

What is the nature of making art? If it is not simply about fashioning forms and colours, then it has to do with the production of meaning…If you begin there you realize that potentially everything is material for art, because at some point it has to have an aspect of concretion and must be framed in relation to people’s lives.

Stuart Morgan, and Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art as Idea as Idea: An Interview with Joseph Kosuth’, Frieze, 6 May 1994 <https://frieze.com/article/art-idea-idea> [accessed 22 February 2020]

Yes, I love seaside. From my background, there should always be a reason why that content. but since I had a conversation with my loving friend,

What truly important is seeking what you really want. What feeling you want to present? How do you feel recently? What is your thinking about this bittersweet life? So, I decided to go to seaside again and make a video with it. I want to put that place name as secret because that would be only my place and intimate place of mine, where someday I would like to bring someone to show how I felt that times.

Yes… There was so many trouble
I finally found my place
And I started shooting

Honestly, I never used this Canon XA10(it was only one remained at uni’s resources store…,) I had no idea what kind of images I can get from it. I was afraid because it was a challenge with the unknown. The place where I’d planned to go, because I already been there, I knew what viewpoint I could get. But that new place was totally unknown, and I should believe my instinct (well that’s life babe.) It doesn’t matter how the image’s quality is high or best colour or not, it is still my image. I had a rough idea that I wanted to make, but real work starts when you really move your hands and begin to do something.

Honest Story

I love to make. It is an exciting experience that I’m actualise something that only existed in my imagination. Although I had a plan, it doesn’t mean that I know why I am doing right now, it can remain a lot of questions. Why sea wave? Why that composition? Why am I making this? Why is tactile or touching so important? After I finished editing, I tried to get the answer to this work; then I realised that I should go back to personal memory.

I remember that hand. No, I am thinking that hand right now. That moment, I didn’t see that hand, but by sense, I could see how it stroked my heart and my hand. I didn’t care in front of the street; how I worked, how was the sky, I just wanted to feel that hand. And I still can see it as if it is happening in front of me. As a third person, I can see in front of me. It is surprising how that small part of the body could create that much sensation. Each of my fingers, fingertips, between the fingers, touched another fingers, fingertips, between the fingers. I don’t remember surrounding, just fingers and warmth of the hand in the dark black hole. It hurt because there was an ending, I knew even that time, it will be end soon. But, no I am not sad because it finished, that long and the short moment has already distilled within my memory, became a violent wave, continuously crush my head and heart. The face faded away from my eyes, that skin scent evaporated from my nose, that warmth cooled in my heart, but that image of touch remained everywhere. It has extracted into the sense of eyes, as a looping memory, possess it as mine and possessed by it.

I never expressed how I felt at that time. Verbal communication is always hard to deliver. The simple words cannot show everything I want to say. I do not know even there was something between hand; I never asked about that moment. Perhaps I was afraid that if there was only one hand. Perhaps I was afraid as soon as I verbalised that memory it would vanish from the memory as if it was just my imagination, never happened in my life.

So, I made this video. I visualised that hand. Metaphorical wave crushes everywhere and touches your eyes from a distance. It never ends, or it ever moves. In the video, visual and sonic senses composed into the one image, but tactile. Is that intentional? Or just I couldn’t deliver the tactility of it?

It’s gone now. Remained only perhaps, maybe or never. But looping.

Seeable Relationship. Sayable connection. #03

This post is not organised writing or essay, but the fragmented thought.


Were we to attempt to see the intervals between things as themselves things, the appearance of the world would be just as noticeably changed

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, and Donald A. Landes, Phenomenology of Perception (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 16

If we hold ourselves to phenomena, then the unity of the thing in perception is not constructed through association, but rather, being the condition of association, this unity precedes the cross-checkings that verify and determine it, this unity precedes itself. If I am walking on a beach toward a boat that has run aground, and if the funnel or the mast merges with the forest that borders the dune, then there will be a moment in which these details suddenly reunite with the boat and become welded to it. As I approached, I did not perceive the resemblances or the proximities that were, in the end, about to reunite with the superstructure of the ship in an unbroken picture. I merely felt that the appearance of the object was about to change, that something was imminent in this tension, as the storm is imminent in the clouds.The spectacle was suddenly reorganised, satisfying my vague expectation. Afterward I recognised, as justifications for the change, the resemblance and the contiguity of what I call “stimuli,” that is, the most determinate phenomena obtained from up close and with which I compose the “true” world.

Ibid, pp. 17-18

The unity of the object is established upon the presentiment of an imminent order that will, suddenly, respond to questions that are merely latent in the landscape. It will resolve a problem only posed in the form of a vague uneasiness;

Ibid, p. 18

Is the moment changing? The duration of changing? There is an interesting example by Merleau-Ponty, which is used as the rabbit and the hunter image in English and french version, but different example in Korean translation. When one woman saw her hotel uniform lover, he is a handsome and beautiful lover. But when she saw him by accident around the hotel, he is just a uniformed hotel carrier. (Each book in French and English pages are below.) I am assuming this example differences because the translator used another source such as the Japanese or German version. However, it is fascinating differences how two examples can explain same thing in different way about the shifting of the unity from one to another without interrupting two unity world. Further, for me, it should be approached differently as a lover and as an image. Well, let’s find out how I can use this example

Merleau-Ponty claims that unity of the thing in perception is not constructed through association, but rather, being the condition of association, which can deliver the immediate answer.

Phenomenology of Perception

The unity of the object is established upon the presentiment of an imminent order that will, suddenly, respond to questions that are merely latent in the landscape. It will resolve a problem only posed in the form of a vague uneasiness; it organises elements that until then did not belong to the same universe and which, for that reason, as Kant said insightfully, could not have been associated.

대상의 통일성은 예의 그 광경에 잠재되어 있을 뿐인 문제에 대하여 단숨에 답을 제공하려는 임박한 질서의 예감에 기초해 있고, 모호한 궁금증의 형태로만 제기 되었을 뿐인 문제를 해결해주며, 그 통일에 도달할 때까지 동일한 세계에 속하지 않았던, 그 때문에 칸트가 심원하게 말한 바대로 연합될 수 없었다던 요소들을 조직한다.

Ibid, p. 18

What answer? Answer from the vagueness? Is that means unity is immanent in the quality of the duration even before the unity? Or is it within the duration of the changing? Or shifting. Once this unity constructed until it is changed into a different world, it habitually maintains its world. Him as a unity of the constructed world. This changing should be a painful and aggressive one. Until then, he would be, or I would see him as a different from the others and not as my unity.

The condition of the seeable, which is stimulated by space or the knowledge, doesn’t satisfy my question of the seeable him (Well, obviously, I just started phenomenology of perception, so I guess there is a long way to go). But I remember Susan Sontag is questioning in her book about the pain from the war pictures. Are we used to its pain because photo exposed too often? Or are we getting a different way of affection?

  • Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phénoménologie De La Perception, Tel, 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), p. 23; Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, and Donald A. Landes, Phenomenology of Perception (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 16
  • Sontag, Susan, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York, N.Y: Picador, 2003)

Extra ➡︎ Action and Speech

Reference: Emmelhainz, Irmgard, ‘Can We Share a World Beyond Representation?’, 106, 2020, pp, 1-10

In The Human Condition Arendt stresses repeatedly that action is primarily symbolic in character and that the web of human relationships is sustained by communicative interaction (HC, 178–9, 184–6, 199–200). We may formulate it as follows. Action entails speech: by means of language we are able to articulate the meaning of our actions and to coordinate the actions of a plurality of agents. Conversely, speech entails action, not only in the sense that speech itself is a form of action, or that most acts are performed in the manner of speech, but in the sense that action is often the means whereby we check the sincerity of the speaker.


  • Lebenswelt: the world of common human experience and interpretation.
  • According to Arendt, modernity, propelled by the destruction of all tradition, is characterised by the irretrievable loss of the experience of shared meaning, which was previously created by talking to and making sense with one another. This loss is accompanied by the disappearance of a space for arguing, resining, argumentation: the space of politics, comprised of speech and action. ::Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Penguin Classics (New York: Penguin Books, 2006)::
  • As Gilles Deleuze put it, the link between man and the world has been broken. Modernity also means the replacement of “society” and “community” by “mass society.”
  • For Arendt, mass society is characterised by isolation and a lack of normal social relationships; as a result, consciousness of a common interest is absent.


  • For Hannah Arendt, the expansion of authoritarianism in Europes in the twentieth century stemmed from the alienation and loneliness brought about by the degradation of the world in common. ➡︎ 문화적 요소가 결핍됬다기 보다 커지면서 퍼진거겠지
  • Representation — the dispositif that, via speech and action, enables appearance in the world in common, and also the human capacity for the creation and dissemination of shared meaning and traditions — has been hijacked by capitalism, authoritarianism, democracy, the internet, and spectacle. ➡︎ 여기서 디스포지티프 의미는 스트럭쳐, 전통과 의미를 구성하는 디스포지티프 ➡︎ 푸코의 글을 다시 읽어보자.
  • Speech and action ➡︎ 한나 아렌트의 스피치와 액션의 의미는 뭐지?
    • 고전적 구분을 따른 아렌트
    • 폴리스(polis) = 공공적 영역 -> 활동 ➡︎ speech
    • 사회적 영역 ➡︎ 경제 활동 및 결사 혹은 집단 ➡︎ 생의 욕구를 해소 하는 장소
    • 오이코스(oikos) = 사적 영역
  • ::각각의 영역에는 각각의 dispositif가 존재하는 걸까?::
  • 여기서 아마도 푸코와의 차이점은 (혹은 같은 점은) Political I’magination (19세기) reproducers a representative form of social cohesion. They did this by constructing and disseminating a world of shared meaning that expressed the alleged “essence” of an imagined community: shared cultural history, iconography, language, food, and dress. ➡︎ ::Anderson, Benedict R. O’G, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed (London ; New York: Verso, 2006)::
  • 1960년대경에선 아트계에서 abandoned representation and dismissed representativity as totalitarian structures, as vehicles for a bland, sexist, and racist humanism and a trite universalism. ➡︎ 청소년기에 있는 것 처럼 스트럭처를 거부했고 (만들어진 스트럭처) 그러면서 각자가 결국 자신의 젠더, ethnic origin, political struggle, or sexual orientation을 대표하며 입장을 발표했다.
  • Minorities
  • 1980s ‘90s 경에선 representativity 가 다시 되돌아왔고 with a vengeance through identity politics and consciousness-raising activism
  • A new, invisible social contract was drawn up in which individuals would now only speak on behalf of themselves as representatives of their own persona experiences of ethnic, political, or gendered specificities, with the mandate to address “everyone” and to secure recognition of “my” ordeal ➡︎ ::결국 self 는 representation으로 밖에 존재할 수 없게 된 것 아닐까? 나는 나를 represents 한다. Self-representation. 하지만 만약에 이게 계속 된다면, 결국 남는 건 텅 비어버린 representation.::
  • 20세기 후반에 globalisation dismantling of the referential economy of political and aesthetic modernity ➡︎ assigned artists universal representativity. Under globalisation, art is disseminated to a globalised mass society through and internationalised culture industry. ➡︎ ::아트 란 그룹 자체로 representation ➡︎ 이건 사실 아트가 아트만을 얘기하게 된 계기가 될 수도 있겠다.::


  • The main problem with artworks that speak on behalf of the struggle of others, or that seek recognition for “my private ordeal.” is that they inhibit a moralising realm of non-shared meaning ➡︎ ::의미 없는 외침:: ➡︎ ::이건 다시 같은 질문으로 되돌아온다, 혼자서만 하는 소리를 작업할 의미가 있는가?:: ➡︎ ::아트 학교에서의 문제점 중에 하나는, 개개인의 목소리에 귀를 기울이기에 점점 더 개인적이 되어가는 질문이 된다는 것에 있을지도 몰라.::
  • When despotic forms of empathy prevail, action and speech are reduced to sheer appearance. Speech without action — such as speech that merely demands recognition — fils to disclose the position that the speaking human occupies in relation to others and the world, beyond simple identitarian or subjective categories. In the opposite case — when we have gestures without speech — these gestures take the form of brute physical action without verbal accompaniment and are thus meaningless (like terrorist attacks or massacres in schools and public spaces.) ➡︎ ::이거야 말로 내가 커뮤니케이션의 중요성을 말했던 부분중에 하나다::
  • For Arendt, actions are only made relevant by the spoken word, which identifies the speaker as the actor announcing what she’s is doing, thereby giving meaning to her actions, but only in relation to others. In other words, no other human behaviour is in greater need of speech than action


  • Through speech and action, we not only learn to understand each other as individual persons, but also to see the same world from on another’s (sometimes opposing) standpoints. In this context, universality means that while everyone sees and hears from a different position, some people have the capacity to multiply their own point of view. ➡︎ ::Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Penguin Classics (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 219.::

Seeable Relationship. Sayable connection. #02

This post is not organised writing or essay, but the fragmented thought.

From the last posting, I think it is worth to continue the topic. Although, I am interested in the topic of the moment of becoming ‘seeble’ or the after moment of the affection (I guess I should read Massumi again), it is still related what is ‘seeing,’ in Foucault’s term

First of all, what intrigues me is when Rajchman describe that Foucault’s seeing is not only visionary but is part of doing. There are two ‘doing’ in self-evidence prison, a participation or acceptance we can refuse. In Foucault’s idiom, évidence is related to the acceptability of a practice. “It is to try to see how we might act on what cannot yet be seen in what we do. It is, in short, a “critical” art, and it is in exercising it that Foucault would be, in Deleuze’s term, a seer or voyant (p. 94).” Then, what is the seer? Deleuze explained Foucault’s seer as a someone who seeing unseen évidneces that makes things we do acceptable or tolerable to us (Deleuze, 1986). In other word, Foucault opens up the conversation that unseen self-evidence, which is not hidden but unseeable. Rather deliver decisive answer but, a seer that make unseeable to seeable êvidnece. If I can connect with this relationship, I may say relationship itself, or the moment itself can be an act of seer with out subject.

Foucault found the similarity of the historians eye to the fiction’s making visible the unseen space of seeing; making visible unseen manifest.

not to show (faire voir) the invisible, but to show the extent to which the invisibility of the visible is invisible. Hence [fiction] bears a profound kinship with space. . . .

Foucault/Blanchot, New York, Zone Books, 1987, p. 24.

Similar aim which showing how things might be otherwise, beyond our self-evidences, other possibilities into the life (I would like connect this in next post about the ‘clicking moment of the realisation’; what is realisation? is it from the invisibility? or unseen? and second question would be the relationship with the space, or the power of the space). Furthermore, Foucault continue to the ‘spatialisation’ of the knowledge. Rather than perceptual evidence through a logic of inference, inductive or deductive, as modern western scholars obsession of the observation, the knowledge in fact, constructed as fiction writers.

Here, I should make clear about my understanding, that it is not about the validation of the philosophy or the science, but the social construction of the knowledge and the space, until the eye no longer deciphers the “prose of the world,” and where, therefore, “the eye was … destined to see and only see, and the ear to hear and only hear (Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 43.). There are many way of the “modes of spatialisation,” such as Natural science’s “technology of the visual”: observatories, microscopes, cyclotrons. And experimentation is central to them. This is not only the history of the philosophy or science, but in the fine art, where validation of the eye had been playing main role. While machinery vision replaced human vision, human eyes had located in new way of spatialisation(let’s keep talking about this later.) Of course, both related representation of the language in theFrench idea which voir with évidence(isn’t it same for Deleuze? Folding the idea from the french), and the knowledge as a spatialised contents in the brain. Is it lost space? displace? Here, again question is what is Foucault’s ‘spatialisation?‘ what does it means when he said space makes knowledge seeable? what’s Foucault’s apparatus?

One of the essential conditions for the epistemological “thaw” of medicine at the end of the 18th century was the organization of the hospital as an “examining apparatus.”

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 185.

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